In 2008 and 2009, U.S. passenger airlines reported aggregate net losses, before extraordinary income and charges, of $14 billion on revenues of $270 billion. p  a  s  s  e  n  g  e  r  r  e  v  e  n  u  e  s  ,  s  o  t  h  e  y  e  x  c  l  u  d  e  c  a  r  g  o  c  a  r  r  i  e  r  s  s  u  c  h  a  s  U  P  S  a  n  d  F  e  d  E  x  .  S  e  e  t  h  e  A  p  p  e  n  d  i  x  f  o  r  a  l  i  s  t  o  f  t  h  e  c  a  r  r  i  e  r  s  i  n  c  l  u  d  e  d  .  T  h  e  n  e  t  i  n  c  o  m  e  b  e  f  o  r  e  e  x  t  r  a  o  r  d  i  n  a  r  y  c  h  a  r  g  e  s  d  o  e  s  i  n  c  l  u  d  e  d  e  b  t  p  a  y  m  e  n  t  s  a  n  d  t  a  x  e  s  .  A  l  l  r  e  f  e  r  e  n  c  e  s  h  e  r  e  t  o  e  a  r  n  i  n  g  s  ,  n  e  t  i  n  c  o  m  e  ,  p  r  o  fi  t  s  a  n  d  l  o  s  s  e  s  u  s  e  t  h  i  s  m  e  a  s  u  r  e  .  I  n  t  e  r  m  s  o  f  D  O  T  i  n  c  o  m  e  s  t  a  t  e  m  e  n  t  a  c  c  o  u  n  t  i  n  g  ,  t  h  i  s  i  s  "  n  e  t  i  n  c  o  m  e  "  m  i  n  u  s  "  o  t  h  e  r  n  e  t  i  n  c  o  m  e  "  .   2   T  h  e  l  o  s  s  e  s  a  r  e  s  l  i  g  h  t  l  y  l  a  r  g  e  r  ,  $  6  7  b  i  l  l  i  o  n  ,  w  h  e  n  i  n  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  o  p  e  r  a  t  i  o  n  s  a  r  e  i  n  c  l  u  d  e  d  .   3   S  e  e  t  h  e  a  p  p  e  n  d  i  x  f  o  r  d  e  t  a  i  l  s  o  f  a  l  l  c  a  l  c  u  l  a  t  i  o  n  s  f  o  r  fi  g  u  r  e  s  .   4   C  a  r  r  i  e  r  s  '  a  s  s  e  t  s  i  n  c  l  u  d  e  a  i  r  c  r  a  f  t  a  n  d  o  t  h  e  r  f  a  c  i  l  i  t  i  e  s  o  n  l  o  n  g  -t  e  r  m  l  e  a  s  e  . -2
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Figure 1: Net Income (/ c2009) per Available Seat-Mile: U.S. Domestic Markets measured by aircraft and 3.6% per year measured by aircraft-seats.
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The fleet size peaked in 2001. From the end of 2001 to the end of 2008 (latest available date), aircraft and aircraft-seats declined by 1.7% and 1.4% per year respectively. Borenstein & Rose (2008, henceforth "BR") addressed the volatility of airline profits, showing that fluctuations in demand and fuel prices along with fixed capital costs and sticky labor costs can explain the industry's earnings volatility. But that analysis did not address the level of profits, the fact that the domestic airline industry has reported negative net income in 23 of 31 years since deregulation and a strongly negative aggregate net present value of earnings. There is no conventional long-run equilibrium explanation for an industry that perpetually loses money, but there are a number of disequilibrium theories that have been suggested by industry participants, financial analysts, and researchers. In this short paper I discuss these theories and attempt to narrow down the range of plausible explanations. 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9
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I. Exogenous cost drivers: taxes and fuel
Industry leaders argue that the tax and fee burden on airline tickets is excessive, today including a 7.5% ticket tax and fees of $6.20 per segment flown. In addition, many airports impose passenger facilities charges (PFCs) of up to $4.50 on each passenger boarding a flight at the airport. One can argue about whether these taxes are excessive given the government costs of supporting the industry, but it is difficult to see how these would lead to losses for more than a short transitional period. Figure 2 shows that the average tax (including federal ticket taxes and PFCs) as a percentage of the base ticket price has climbed steadily, and is today about twice as high as when it was 8% through most of the 1980s.
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But the average dollar tax per ticket (in 2009 dollars) is today at about the same level it was in the profitable late 1990s.
Over the last 30 years, the primary form of taxation has transitioned from strictly a percentage excise tax to a mix of percentage and per-segment taxes. In the 1980s, the entire ticket tax was a percentage of the ticket value. The passenger facility charges were added in the early 1990s, the segment tax in 1997 and the September 11 security fee in 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 early 2002, all based on the number of flights the passenger boards, regardless of the fare paid. As a result, as real fares have declined, dropping significantly after the September 11 attacks, the tax burden increased as a percentage of the base fare.
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The problem seems to be not that taxes have risen, but that the base fares have fallen and stayed so low. Even the post-9/11 tax increase has mostly reverted in real terms. Figure 3 shows the average ticket price relative to 1979, adjusted for inflation and trip distance (which has increased substantially over time).
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While taxes and fees have changed incrementally, the industry scale has changed massively. In the standard long-run adjustment dynamics, it seems that the industry should have been able to achieve the scale change necessary to incorporate and pass through these taxes. My own research in progress suggests that changes in passenger facilities charges are nearly entirely passed through to customers within two quarters. 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 While there is no question that the airlines earnings are affected in the short run by extreme oil price fluctuations such as occurred in the last few years, there doesn't appear to be a barrier to capacity adjustment over 3 to 6 months in response to oil price changes. The rapid reductions in schedules in the second half of 2008 make that clear.
Still, reducing flight schedules doesn't eliminate costs if those costs are fixed or sticky. In times of growing demand, carriers can adjust fairly smoothly to unanticipated cost increases by growing more slowly, without having to ground aircraft or reduce workforce size. When demand is stagnant or declining, however, rescaling operations in response to upward cost shocks is more difficult and costly. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 
II. Exogenous demand shocks
The role of demand shocks in airline losses is most notable in 2001-02 and in 2008-09. Prior to 9/11, however, it appears that domestic demand grew fairly steadily. Inferring demand shifts from average yield and revenue passenger-miles, demand changes are presented in figure 5.
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Demand increased by 110% from 1979 to 2000, growing in 16 of those 21 years. Yet, the industry made money in only 8 of those years and overall lost $3 billion ($2009) over this period. The economic downturns during this period certainly affected airline industry profits, but we wouldn't expect investors to believe that demand growth would be completely constant and steady. It is hard to see how unanticipated demand shocks during this time could be a credible explanation for the overall poor performance.
Demand shocks are a more plausible explanation for the losses of the 2000s. The post-9/11 demand drop, which was about 20% from 2000 to 2002, was unprecedented. By 2008, demand was still about 3% lower than it had been in 2000, and then it dropped about 11% in 2009. Because of the fixed capital costs and sticky labor costs, the decade of depressed demand was accompanied by a decade of depressed prices. In real terms prices were 20% The other notable change in domestic service over this period was the increase in average passenger load factor from 71% in 2000 to 81% in 2009. This was a continuation of the very steady increase in the 1990s from about 60% in 1990 (and most of the 1980s). The increases are mostly independent of demand shocks, rising or holding constant in every year except a 2% downward tick after September 11, which was completely reversed by 2003. Increased fuel costs would make higher load factors more economic, but there is no evidence that the load factor increases have been greater during periods of rising than periods of falling fuel costs. More likely, load factor increases have been a result of improving yield management technologies.
III. Entry and expansion of low-cost carriers
Many industry observers and participants point to low-cost (and low-fare) carriers (LCCs) as part of the reason for low industry profits, but there is wide disagreement on what the connection is. If LCCs are simply offering a lower-quality product, then their differentiated product should find its niche in the market if there is sufficient demand for that quality level, yielding an equilibrium with both types earning normal returns.
Among industry and labor leaders, a common view is that new low-cost entrants and LCC incumbents have made excessive capacity investments during growth periods, and sometimes even during downturns, that have depressed prices for all. In order to discourage excessive investment, the largest airline pilots union has called for increasing capital requirements as part of FAA licensing of new airlines.
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But the evidence doesn't appear to support the idea that new entrants or older LCCs are more prone to over-investment than the legacy airlines. Figure 6 presents the aircraftseat fleet size of LCCs and non-LCCs (including legacy carriers and regional carriers who generally operate as codeshare partners to the legacy carriers). Two things are clear from this figure. First, LCCs in aggregate have experienced no more erratic fleet size adjustments despite being less well-established on average.
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Figure 6: Aircraft-Seats in Fleet grow gradually even after 9/11 while remaining much less unprofitable than the legacy carriers, as shown later. If anything, it appears to be the legacy carriers who are more prone to over-investment relative to the growth of their traffic. Second, the changes in fleet size of the LCCs is dwarfed by the variation of the non-LCC fleet, suggesting that LCC investment decisions have not been the primary driver in industry capacity changes.
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An alternate view of LCCs is that they have been gradually chipping away at the entrenched positions of legacy carriers that have much higher costs. The change has been gradual, because the legacy carriers are also protected by network marketing programs and other activities that raise barriers to entry by more efficient firms. Potentially exclusionary activities of legacy carriers include frequent-flyer and corporate discount programs that exchange discounts for customer loyalty on a portfolio of unrelated routes, relationships with airports that allow large incumbents to restrict the availability of gates, landing slots and other resources to potential entrants.
LCCs have been growing steadily since the early 1990s. Figure 7 shows their domestic market share, by revenue passenger-miles since 1979.
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LCCs now compete (defined as at least 10% passenger share) on over 60% of all airport pairs, and over 80% of all city-pairs if one assumes that the different airports in Dallas, Houston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington DC are in the same markets.
And LCCs have much lower costs than the legacy carriers. Figure 8 shows the operating cost per available seat-mile adjusted for average flight distance (or "haul") length.
5
Adjusted for the average flight distance, legacy carrier costs have remained 30%-60% higher than the LCCs for nearly all of the deregulation era, averaging about 40% higher in the last decade.
The cause of this persistent cost difference is an area in need of further research. Fuel 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 costs are approximately the same for all airlines. Wages for flight attendants and ground crew at Southwest airlines are about comparable to those for similar staff at legacy carriers, and pilots of comparable aircraft are paid about the same. That may not be true for some of the other LCCs, however. I am not aware of an analysis that incorporates full benefits packages including pensions. Work rules are clearly more flexible at Southwest and the other LCCs, and employees in general are assigned to a wider array of activities, probably leading to higher labor utilization. Aircraft utilization is higher at Southwest than at legacy carriers, though it would be valuable to study how that has changed as Southwest has expanded to airports with more congestion and weather disruptions. Quality factors also differ -on-time rates, passenger complaint rates, legroom, seat assignment policies, among other factors. When all of these factors are considered, however, it is not clear which carriers have the high-quality product in domestic markets.
While the cost differential between LCCs and non-LCCs has remained large, the average price differential has been shrinking, as shown in figure 9. Figure 9 is adjusted for the average trip distance of passengers flying on each type of carriers. 
IV. A series of unfortunate events?
Demand and cost shocks have certainly played a significant role in the airline industry's poor financial results, but there is little reason to think those disruptions will be less frequent in the future. Furthermore, after more than 30 years, it seems unlikely that airline losses are due entirely to a series of unfortunate exogenous events relative to what management and investors should have expected.
Throughout deregulation, the legacy carriers have maintained much higher costs than LCCs, but the price premia they have been able to charge have gradually declined over the last 20 years, shrinking by more than 60% over that time. As a result, while the 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 The response of legacy carriers has been to expand their networks through mergers and alliances. There is little evidence that such moves narrow the cost gap with LCCs, but network expansion may help differentiate their products and improve service. It also may increase their ability to use network marketing devices to dampen LCC competition.
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The airline financial performance has improved substantially in 2010 and the industry seems likely to be close to break-even on domestic operations for the year. Still, the experience of the last decade suggests that until legacy carriers can either close the cost gap with LCCs or increase the price premium they maintain, they will likely have difficulty earning consistent profits through the typical cycles in the airline business environment. This short paper obviously doesn't settle the issues surrounding airline profitability. I believe that the topic would benefit from much more investigation by industrial organization economists. All price level adjustments are to 2009q4 using the all-urban Consumer Price Index. where an observation is all of the passengers flying route r on "carrier set" c with n coupons in the trip during quarter t. Each trip is a one-way journey between two airports that may be one-coupon (no change-of-plane) or two-coupon (one change-of-plane at an intermediate airport. Both directions on the route are collapsed into the same observation. Round-trips are broken into two one-way observations. The carrier set is a single carrier observation for one-coupon trips. It is the pair of carriers for two-coupon trips (which are often the same carrier on both coupons). N SDist r is non-stop distance between the airports. The regression is weighted by passengers in each observation. On average, each regression includes 80,000 observations covering about 7 million passengers, with more observation and passengers in later years I then calculate the fitted values for the tickets sold in the same quarter one year later, AvgP rice for domestic operations of all passenger carriers included in the analysis (from Form P-12). The change in this ratio from one quarter to the same quarter in the following year is used to rescale the revenue change for each quarter. I aggregated the revenue difference over each year to get the annual change in prices. This calculation corrects for route distance in much the same way as for figure 3, but the regression is run only on legacy plus regional carrier observations and the out-of-sample prediction and comparison is for LCC carriers. For every quarter, I estimate an OLS regression of average fare on route distance and distance squared using only data from legacy and regional carriers. I then calculate the fitted values for the LCC observations and the aggregate revenue difference if LCC customers had paid the fitted value price instead of the actual LCC price they did pay. The correction for baggage and change/cancellation fees is similar to figure 3. 
